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PANEL I:  The Patent Landscape with 
Bilski on the Map 
Moderator:  Jeanne  Fromer 
Panelists:  James W. Dabney 
 Clarisa Long 
 Brian P. Murphy 
 
MS. SCHAFFER-GOLDMAN: 
Hello, we’re going to get started.  Thank you all for being here 
today. 
Welcome to the 2009 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
and Entertainment Law Journal’s Symposium titled, 
“Functionality: At the Crossroads of IP.” 
My name is Regina Schaffer-Goldman, and I am the Editor-in-
Chief of the 20th Volume of the Journal, which is more 
affectionately known as the IPLJ. 
We are so pleased to see the culmination of many months of 
preparation today.  It is the IPLJ’s 20th Anniversary Edition, and 
we wanted to commemorate this occasion with a fantastic 
Symposium.  As you will see, we have assembled a truly all-star 
group of legal scholars and practitioners today. 
Before we get started, though, we would like to acknowledge 
and thank some of the people who have been instrumental in 
making this event possible.  First and foremost, I would like to 
 
A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexx/book3.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
   Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.    Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York, New York.   
   Max Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Columbia Law School.   Partner, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York, New York. 
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thank Emily Nash, who is our Symposium Editor and whom many 
of you have already met. 
Since May, Emily has been working tirelessly on making our 
Volume 20 Symposium outstanding, and I think she has really 
outdone herself.  Her initiative has brought an excellent group of 
panelists and moderators together. 
When you see her today, please take a moment to thank Emily 
for bringing this symposium to life.  We’d also like to thank 
Emily’s team of IPLJ staffers, who assisted us in getting ready for 
the Symposium during the past few weeks. 
Now, Emily and the IPLJ have also been very fortunate to have 
the assistance of David Quiles and Helen Herman from the Office 
of Public Programming and Continuing Legal Education.  They 
were absolutely wonderful in helping us plan and execute this 
symposium. 
We’d especially like to thank David for helping us facilitate 
this event.  David, wherever you are, you kept us on track every 
step of the way and you really helped this process run smoothly. 
We’d also like to thank our faculty co-moderators, Professors 
Jeanne Fromer and Sonia Katyal.  Their recommendations, advice, 
and wonderful ideas have truly helped shape this Symposium, and 
their guidance has been indispensable. 
Of course, we would be remiss in our acknowledgements if we 
did not recognize Professor Hugh Hansen, one of Fordham’s 
distinguished Intellectual Property professors.  As always, he has 
given us his thoughtful insight and advice for which we are so 
grateful. 
Special thanks also to Professor Wendy Gordon, whose ideas 
were invaluable in conceiving this Symposium, and Professor 
Susan Scafidi, who advised us throughout this summer and fall. 
In addition, we would like to thank our excellent panelists and 
moderators for joining us at Fordham today; as I mentioned earlier, 
our line-up is unparalleled.  We are looking forward to a full day of 
diverse, insightful, and informative discussions and debate. 
Last, but not least, we could not be here today without the 
IPLJ’s editors and staff.  We would like to recognize them for all 
C01_PANEL_1_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2010  11:53 AM 
2010] PATENT LANDSCAPE WITH BILSKI ON THE MAP 717 
 
of their hard work this year.  They are the backbone of our Journal, 
and we are endlessly appreciative for everything they do. 
The IPLJ is a very special place, a haven for IP enthusiasts here 
at Fordham.  Our subject matter runs the gamut from breach of 
contract issues in college coaching contracts to a consideration of 
race, personality, and ownership in the digital commons of music. 
The four books we put out each year reflect our fascinating and 
wide-ranging subject matter.  We’re excited to announce that an 
electronic version of our upcoming book, our first book of Volume 
20, will be available shortly on the web at www.IPLJ.net.  In 
addition, we have copies of last year’s issues for your perusal.  
Please feel free to help yourself; they’re outside. 
Of course, we encourage you to consider subscribing to, or 
sponsoring, the IPLJ.  We also encourage authors to submit to our 
Journal.  Throughout the day, feel free to reach out to our Journal 
members, or visit the Journal office downstairs. 
As you’ll see, we have amassed a truly unique group of law 
students.  This group includes scientists, musicians, and artists.  
Their diverse interests and backgrounds help make the Journal 
office such an enjoyable and dynamic place to be.  In short, we are 
extremely proud of our Journal and its members. 
Now to today’s events: To give you a brief preview for today, 
we start out with opening remarks from Fordham’s own Dean 
Treanor.  Next, our first panel will examine the Federal Circuit’s In 
re Bilski decision, and the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in 
Bilski v. Doll, and how it will change the patent landscape with 
regard to patent eligible subject matter. 
Our second panel today will consider how functionality 
informs design law, trade dress, and product configuration.  After 
our second panel, we’ll break for lunch.  Finally, our third panel 
will consider how trade secrets and other areas of IP can protect 
advanced technology. 
In sum, it is an exciting line-up.  We encourage everyone to 
attend all three panels today.  Please note that today’s panels will 
be published in Volume 20 this year, and that will be out in the 
spring of 2010. 
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So without further ado, it is now my pleasure to introduce Dean 
Treanor, who will be delivering opening remarks.  As many of you 
know, William Michael Treanor is the Dean of Fordham 
University School of Law. 
Dean Treanor has been at Fordham since 1991.  He is a 
constitutional law scholar who specializes in constitutional history.  
Since he’s been at Fordham, he has taught a wide range of courses 
including constitutional decision-making, criminal law, land use, 
property law, and, of course, intellectual property. 
We are so pleased and honored that Dean Treanor will kick off 
this year’s Symposium.  So please give a hand in welcoming Dean 
Treanor.  Thank you very much. 
DEAN TREANOR: 
Well, thank you very much, Regina, that was really a 
wonderful introduction and I think it really captures the enthusiasm 
that we at Fordham Law School have about intellectual property. 
This has been an amazing week for us at Fordham Law School 
in the intellectual property world.  The last time I was in this room, 
which was two days ago, Chief Judge Michel of the Federal 
Circuit, gave a public lecture and that was the culmination of his 
time at Fordham as a guest of our Intellectual Property Institute. 
We’re very focused on intellectual property here at Fordham.  
It really goes back to Professor Hugh Hansen, who really was a 
visionary in putting intellectual property at Fordham on the map, 
and it continued with Professor Joel Reidenberg and Professor 
Mark Patterson.  We also have two extraordinary moderators of 
this Journal, Professor Sonia Katyal and Professor Jeanne Fromer. 
This year, we started an IP Clinic, the Samuelson-Glushko 
Clinic, and Ron Lazebnik is here.  We’ve had some fabulous 
visiting professors; we have Wendy Gordon and Susan Scafidi, 
who did so much to put this together.  Then we have events like 
this, which are just a showcase. 
I was saying to Regina, as we walked in, that this was really 
like a rock-and-roll heaven of the IP world; it’s an extraordinary 
program. 
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So I want to thank all of the people who did so much to put it 
together again, our moderators, Jeanne and Sonia, and the 
fabulous, fabulous IP Journal staff.  As we were walking in, 
Professor Orit Fischman Afori said, “You know, I publish in many 
IP Journals, but this is the best,” and it’s just true. 
So I’d like to recognize Regina, who’s doing such a fabulous 
job as Editor-in-Chief; Emily Nash, who put together this amazing, 
amazing Symposium, great, great job.  You’re terrific.  Managing 
Editor, Michele Gipp, what a fabulous staff you have. 
Just again, Helen Herman, David Quiles, Alice Wong, thanks 
for making this happen—this doesn’t all happen by accident.  
Flawlessness has a cost, and you’re the ones who make it all 
happen. 
So I am so excited.  It’s going to be a great day.  It’s a great 
symposium.  It’s put on by, well, I think we all have to 
acknowledge the greatest IP journal in the world.  So without any 
further ado, let me turn you over to the first panel. 
MS. NASH: 
Thank you so much, Dean Treanor.  I’m glad he was very 
modest on behalf of the Journal.  I know we got started a few 
minutes late, so I’ll keep this brief. 
I’d just like to begin by introducing Jeanne Fromer.  Before 
coming to Fordham Law School, Professor Fromer served as law 
clerk to Justice David Souter of the United States Supreme Court 
and to Robert Sack of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. 
She worked at Hale and Dorr LLP, now WilmerHale, as an 
intellectual property attorney.  She earned her B.A., summa cum 
laude, in Computer Science from Barnard, received her S.M. in 
electrical engineering and computer science from M.I.T., and her 
J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 2002. 
I think we can all agree, following what Dean Treanor said, 
that perhaps her most impressive credential thus far is that she is 
now the Faculty Moderator of Volume 20 of the IPLJ, so without 
further ado, Professor Fromer. 
PROF. FROMER: 
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Thank you.  I agree. 
What I’m going to do right now, before I introduce our 
wonderful panelists, is to provide a little background on the Bilski1 
case and then allow our panelists to jump in after I introduce them. 
First, a word on how Bilski relates to the theme of the 
symposium today about functionality.  Patent law is generally 
about protecting functional things, but not all functional things end 
up being patentable.2 
One of the key questions in the Bilski case, which I’ll go into a 
little bit more, is which functional things are patentable.  How do 
you sort between those that are and aren’t? 
In the Bilski case, we’ve got two inventors who applied for a 
patent for the following invention: “A method for managing the 
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity 
provider at a fixed price. . . .”3  It basically is a method for hedging 
risk in commodities. 
The invention wasn’t tied to software in any way.  It was the 
method with the following steps: initiating a series of transactions, 
identifying market participants, and making the transactions 
happen between them.4 
When the inventors applied for a patent, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) refused to grant it.5  The 
inventors appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and the Board 
of Patent Appeals affirmed, and then they took their case to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.6 
 
 1 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing the use of the 
machine-or-transformation test to determine patent eligibility of process claims), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
 2 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) (holding that a method 
for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers is not patentable 
subject matter). 
 3 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. at 950.  
 6 See id. 
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection.7  The court 
made its ruling against its understanding, based on a number of 
Supreme Court decisions, that a patent can’t preempt fundamental 
principles, such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.8 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis used the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on patentable subject matter to divine the test for 
patentable processes.9 Processes are one of the categories that § 
101 in the patent law states is patentable subject matter.10 
What the Federal Circuit saw in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
was that something can be a patentable process if it satisfies either 
of two tests: it either must be tied to a machine (and that indicates 
that it’s not a natural phenomenon, not an abstract idea), or it must 
transform an article to a specified different state.11 
This transformation, according to the Federal Circuit, must be 
central to the purpose of the claimed process.12  It can’t constitute 
mere insignificant activity, either before or after the solution.13 
This transformation has to impose meaningful limits on claim 
scope, according to the Federal Circuit.14  It can’t preempt all uses 
of the process, in which case it would be akin to an abstract idea.15 
The court talked about three types of transformations: of 
physical objects,16 of signals or data that represent physical 
 
 7 See id. at 966. 
 8 See id. at 952 (“[T]he Court has held that a claim is not a patent-eligible ‘process’ if 
it claims ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))). 
 9 See id. 
 10 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 11 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
 12 See id. at 962. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 961. 
 15 See id. at 957 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)). 
 16 See id. at 962 (“It is virtually self-evident that a process for a chemical or physical 
transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible subject matter.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
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objects,17 and of abstract concepts.18  The court ordered these from 
most to least transformative.19 
In applying this test of machine-or-transformation to the 
method at issue here, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
invention at issue was not patentable.20  The court reasoned that the 
invention was not limited to any specific machine in the associated 
patent claims.21  And, the Federal Circuit continued, the invention 
was about transforming legal obligations or relationships, business 
risks, or other abstractions, which did not come close to the 
transformation that the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
envisioned as constituting patentable subject matter.22 
The implications of the Federal Circuit’s decision could be 
enormous.  First of all, as per this rule, it is going to be harder to 
patent business methods. 
The implications for software are big.  Is software tied to a 
general-purpose computer, a machine in the classical sense, given 
that the software is a set of instructions that runs on a general-
purpose computer? 
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit talked in her Bilski 
dissent about how the industry has relied on the availability of 
software patents for quite a long time.23  Is it wrong to upset this 
expectation? 
As our panelists will suggest today, the implications of Bilski 
may reach even beyond these areas.  The Supreme Court recently 
 
 17 See id. at 962–63 (noting that the transformation of raw x-ray data representing 
physical and tangible objects renders a claim patent eligible, but that a process of 
graphically displaying variances of data from average values does not (citing In re Abele, 
684 F.2d 902, 908–09 (Fed. Cir. 1982))). 
 18 See id. at 963 (“We note that, at least in most cases, gathering data would not 
constitute a transformation of any article.” (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–41 
(Fed. Cir. 1989))). 
 19 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 20 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962–66. 
 21 Id. at 962. 
 22 Id. at 963. 
 23 Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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heard arguments in the Bilski case on November 9th, and the Court 
has not issued a decision yet.24 
From a sense of oral argument, though, it looks like the patent 
applicants will lose, possibly nine to nothing.  The Supreme 
Court’s oral argument was mostly about deciding the grounds on 
which the inventors should lose. 
The Supreme Court Justices were all over the map during 
questioning.25  Some Justices suggested that the Court ought to 
look to the original understanding of the Intellectual Property 
Clause in the Constitution.26  “What are useful arts?,” the Supreme 
Court justices asked.27  Some Justices suggested that maybe only 
technological arts ought to be patentable, and not non-
technological inventions.28  Some Justices wondered what the 
word “Process” in § 101 of the patent statute means.29  They were 
interested in statutory interpretation.30  Others were thinking about 
the policy implications of allowing business methods or software 
to be patentable.31  Others were merely referring to the Supreme 
Court precedent on abstract ideas, thinking how that would apply 
in this case.32  One Justice wondered what Judge Giles Rich, one of 
the principal influences on the 1952 Patent Act,33 thought about 
this issue.34  The lawyer’s answer was that Judge Rich wrote the 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.35 
 
 24 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735, argued sub nom. 
Bilski v. Kappos (U.S. Nov. 9, 2009) (No. 08-964). 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. at 4, 6–7.  The Intellectual Property Clause empowers Congress “to Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respected Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
 27 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 4. 
 28 See id. at 12–13. 
 29 See id. at 20–21. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at 6–7, 46. 
 32 See id. at 17–18. 
 33 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
 34 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 17. 
 35 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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opinion, which had a very broad view of patentable subject 
matter.36 
Almost all of the Justices were concerned with wacky 
inventions.37  For example, Justice Sotomayor asked whether a 
method of speed dating would be patentable.38  Justice Breyer, a 
former law professor, wondered if he could patent a process for 
teaching antitrust law to students where 80% of them stay awake.39 
Some of the Justices were concerned about allowing software 
to be patented.40  One had a question about whether software as 
implemented in a machine—an actual product, not a process—
ought to be patentable.41 
The question that remains open, I think, after the oral argument 
is how the Justices are going to decide the case.  Will they discuss 
the patentability of software?  Will they discuss business methods 
broadly?  Will they confine their ruling narrowly to Bilski’s patent 
application, which is not about software? 
With that background in mind, I would like to introduce our 
panelists who will speak in turn on Bilski.  Afterward, we will take 
questions. 
First up is going to be Jim Dabney.  Jim is a partner at Fried 
Frank.  Before that, he was a partner at Pennie & Edmonds. 
Jim has been recognized as a leading lawyer by Chambers 
USA: America’s Leading Lawyers for Business, not only in one 
area of intellectual property, but in the areas of patent, trademark, 
and copyright.  Jim argued two patent cases before the Supreme 
Court, and he won both of them. 
The two cases he argued were Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado 
Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,42 which considered whether 
appellate jurisdiction lay in the Federal Circuit when there was a 
 
 36 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 17. 
 37 See id. at 7, 9–10. 
 38 Id. at 7. 
 39 Id. at 9–10. 
 40 See id. at 42–46. 
 41 Id. at 42. 
 42 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
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patent claim as a counterclaim in a lawsuit,43 and KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,44 a case which has changed the 
landscape of nonobviousness in patent law.  Jim is going to be 
speaking about false positives and negatives in patentable subject 
matter. 
Next up is going to be Clarisa Long.  Clarisa is the Max 
Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Columbia 
Law School.  She has expertise in all areas of intellectual property, 
though her IP experience seems to have begun in patent law. 
She has written a lot of significant works in the academic 
literature, including how patents serve as signals for venture 
funding.45  She has also written about the information costs of 
patent and copyright law46 and the PTO’s attempts to influence the 
shape of patent law.47 
She clerked for Judge Alvin Schall on the Federal Circuit.  She 
will be speaking about the culture of the Federal Circuit as a court 
and how that has contributed to the way patentable subject matter 
is defined generally, and how it decided Bilski. 
Finally, we have Brian Murphy.  Brian is a partner at Morgan 
Lewis in the Intellectual Property practice.  He serves as a Deputy 
Practice Group Leader for the Patent Litigation Group.  In patent 
matters, he has represented many pharmaceutical companies, 
including GlaxoSmithKline, SPI Pharma, and DuPont Air Products 
Nanomaterials. 
In the past several years, he has been recognized as a New 
York Super Lawyer in the area of intellectual property litigation.  
Brian will be speaking about Bilski’s machine-or-transformation 
test, in the sense of judicial policy making, and the uncertain 
prognosis for diagnostic and personalized medicine patents. 
Without further ado, here is Jim. 
 
 43 Id. at 827.  
 44 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
45  See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). 
46  See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
465 (2004). 
47  See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1965 (2009). 
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MR. DABNEY: 
Well, thank you for that introduction.  How many people in the 
audience are students, as opposed to practitioners or law 
professors? 
Well, it is a real privilege to address you today.  I think you 
cannot really appreciate what Professor Fromer was saying without 
understanding that you all are living in an environment that did not 
exist twenty-five years ago. 
That environment is, since 1982 there has been in the United 
States an intermediate appellate court, known as the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,48 and almost all—the 
Holmes v. Vornado case has left a crack in the firmament of 
appellate jurisdiction for regional circuits to hear patent cases—
intermediate appeals in patent cases, since 1982, have gone to a 
single, intermediate appellate court.  One consequence of that was 
that there began in 1982 a series of rather significant changes in the 
way patent law in the United States came to be applied. 
People who graduated law school after 1982—and I was not in 
that category, but I came to the field of patent law after 1982—
would tend to educate themselves on the law of patents in a way 
that was very efficient, which is: let us look and see what this one 
court of appeals, that has all of this power, has said on the subject 
because that is probably going to have the most practical use, and 
we do not need to concern ourselves with sources of law that that 
court does not apply. 
One consequence of that was the development of a body of law 
that, in the last seven or eight years, has come under increasing 
scrutiny and, some would say, deconstruction by the Supreme 
Court. 
One of the most controversial of the case law developments 
that happened after 1982, in the Federal Circuit, was the 
development that happened in the case that is on page 46 of your 
course materials.  This was a case known as State Street Bank & 
 
 48 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982).    
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Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.49  I happen to know a 
little bit about this case, in part because the patent that was at issue 
in this case was actually prosecuted by my former law firm, Pennie 
& Edmonds.50 
The State Street Bank case basically raised the question, which 
I think of as the “what kind” question: What kind of intellectual 
conceptions fall within the regulatory scope of patent law? 
For most of our nation’s history, we thought we knew what 
kind of subject matter was and was not protected by patent law.  
The 1952 Act says there are four categories of things that are 
protected by patents.51 Those four categories are: machines,52 I 
think we all know what a machine is; manufactures,53 I think we 
know what that is; compositions of matter,54 all the pharmaceutical 
companies know what that is; and then the fourth category is 
process.55 
There has been a great deal of discussion and debate over what 
is encompassed by the statutory term process, which is very 
broadly defined in the 1952 Act.56  Strictly speaking, the question 
before the Supreme Court in the United States has to do with 
whether or not the term “process” encompasses the type of novel 
sequence of legal relationships, entered in a certain sequence, that 
are claimed in the Bilski case. 
But all of those four categories are subject to an overarching 
limitation which is that Congress is only authorized to grant 
patents for subject matter that is intended to, or does, promote the 
progress of useful arts, using the 18th century term, useful arts.57 
 
 49 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 50 U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9, 1993). 
 51 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. § 100. 
 57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
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I was quite surprised when the Supreme Court took the Bilski 
case, as were many practitioners, because the actual claim in 
Bilski, and the subject matter in Bilski is, in many respects, trivial 
and of no commercial importance. 
Bilski was a case in which, as you have heard, there was no 
machinery involved.  This was a trading strategy that people had 
devised.58  It is the rare commercial activity today that is carried on 
strictly in a person’s head, or with a pencil and paper and does not 
involve a computer system or anything like that. 
So the Supreme Court could render a decision in Bilski that 
does not have anything to do with software, that does not have 
anything to do with even the State Street Bank case.  It was clear to 
me, from the oral argument, that the Justices, at least prior to the 
oral argument, had not fully comprehended that.  In the oral 
argument, the attorney for the Solicitor General told the Justices 
that the State Street Bank case would have come out exactly the 
same way under the machine-or-transformation test that the 
Federal Circuit had articulated in the Bilski case itself.59 
That puzzled at least Chief Justice Roberts, and I am sure it 
would puzzle many people who are not active practitioners in 
patent law, and I will try to explain to you more about that. 
If you look in your book on page 46, you will find one of the 
more controversial statements that was ever uttered in United 
States patent case law decision-making.  There is a statement 
towards the bottom of your materials that says, “Since the 1952 
Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, 
subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied 
to any other process or method.”60 
That statement, which is not supported by any citation of 
authority, it is just an ipse dixit, was quite surprising to a lot of 
people at the time.  But that statement, in the context of this case, 
 
 58 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. 
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
 59 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 41–42. 
 60 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
C01_PANEL_1_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2010  11:53 AM 
2010] PATENT LANDSCAPE WITH BILSKI ON THE MAP 729 
 
did not raise the hard question, because in the State Street Bank 
case, what was claimed was a machine.61 
You cannot get this from the State Street Bank case itself, but 
State Street Bank was a case in which the commercial value of the 
claimed invention had nothing to do with computer software or 
computer systems.  This was an innovation that allowed for 
economies of scale to be realized by sponsors of mutual funds 
whose expense ratios would otherwise be too high. 
So some rather clever people figured out that if you would 
form a partnership that would be treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes, you could have a whole series of feeder funds run in a 
fund-of-funds structure.  This would allow for the sponsorship, 
marketing, and sale of mutual funds under circumstances that 
would otherwise be uneconomic to carry on. 
Well, what do you need in order to carry on a business like 
that?  Well, what you need is a computer system that will keep 
your accounts straight.  That will keep track of who owns what, 
what the daily asset value is in the various feeder funds, how the 
expenses should be allocated, and how gains, losses, redemptions, 
and contributions should be allocated. 
It was nothing more than a garden variety accounting system, 
implemented by means of a computer.  But unlike most garden 
variety accounting computer systems, this one was limited to its 
deployment in the context of a series of legal relationships, in 
which certain tax and economic advantages were realizable. 
So the question in State Street Bank, the holding of State Street 
Bank, was that the machine that was claimed in that case was a 
machine.62  Well, the patent law has always applied to machines, 
so of course a machine can be patentable. 
The hard question that was not asked, and was not answered, in 
State Street Bank, and unfortunately is not raised and cannot 
properly be answered in the Bilski case is: did that machine in State 
Street Bank differ from preexisting accounting systems in a 
patentably-significant way?  That is the hard question that is not 
 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
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raised by Bilski, which had the Justices seemingly confused by the 
Government’s position that State Street Bank would come out the 
same way under the machine-or-transformation test as State Street 
Bank did under the law that was applied by the Federal Circuit in 
that case. 
So we come back to the question that is raised in the Bilski 
case, which is the “what kind” question.  Based on this dictum that 
is on page 46 of your case book, and I emphasize it is pure, 
unadulterated dictum, there was an explosion of attempts to seek 
patent protection for subject matter that is seemingly described by 
the statement. 
One of my favorites is the patent that was issued in 2003 for a 
method of jury selection.63  The patent recites the following series 
of steps: you get two lawyers in a room; you get a whole set of 
potential jurors in the room; you go through a peremptory 
challenge exercise.  You all know how lawyers get to exercise 
challenges for cause and challenges—subject to constitutional 
restrictions, you cannot do it based on race and all that stuff—but 
you get to exercise a certain amount of choice over who you want 
on your jury.  Trial lawyers can sometimes make a lot of money by 
convincing clients that they are really good jury pickers.  So this is 
a method where you get the potential jury pool and you strike off 
the jurors who you think are going to be adverse to you. 
So you create a pool of the struck jurors.  Now you have two 
groups of people, the ones that you think are good for you and the 
others that you think are not so good for you and then you make 
your presentation to both sets of jurors.  You see whether the ones 
you think are good for you actually vote for you better than the 
ones that you struck off.  If it turns out that the jurors you struck 
off are no better for you than the ones that you kept on, that means 
you are not a very good jury picker, and you need to refine your 
technique. 
So this patent describes a method for improving jury selection 
techniques.  That was a method that was characterized by the 
Patent Office as a patentable invention and a patent issued to a 
 
 63 U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001) (issued Aug. 19, 2003). 
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person from New York named Genevie in 2003.64  I have a copy of 
it if anybody wants to see it, I can give you the patent number. 
That is the kind of allegedly patentable invention involved in 
the Bilski case that raises the “what kind” question.  What kinds of 
intellectual conceptions do we think should fall within the subject 
matter regulation of patent law as distinct from something else? 
As the State Street Bank case illustrates, the statutory 
classifications “machine” and “process” are quite unsatisfactory as 
dividers between what ought and ought not be patentable.  The 
reason for that is shown by the State Street Bank case itself.  There 
is almost nothing that you could think of today that could not be 
characterized as a machine, almost nothing. 
I think most people would agree that music, an original song 
that someone might write, is probably not an invention, even 
though it might be novel, non-obvious, and useful.  But, you could 
characterize a song as a process for entertaining an audience.  You 
could describe a machine that outputs certain sounds, which just so 
happen to correspond with the notes of a song, just as a computer 
system can be configured to keep accounts the way you can with a 
pencil and paper. 
There is a certain amount of artificiality to discussions about 
whether or not something is or is not properly classified as a 
process or as a machine.  That leaves unasked and unanswered the 
hard question, which the Federal Circuit did not have to address 
because it was an intermediate court, but the Supreme Court in 
Bilski may very well address, which is—what is embraced by the 
constitutional term useful arts? 
This is why many people in the patent community are very 
worried about Bilski.  It is rather ironic that those who are 
financially supporting the Bilski petitioners in the Supreme Court 
did so because they felt that the court of appeals in Bilski had gone 
too far in limiting what all can be claimed to be an invention in the 
business method patent arena. 
It apparently never occurred to those who are supporting this 
that the Supreme Court of the United States would far more likely 
 
 64 Id. 
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view the Federal Circuit as having gone not nearly far enough in 
limiting what cannot be patented as an invention.  As is illustrated 
in one of the briefs that Professor Fromer has included in the 
materials, the standard that was applied by the Federal Circuit in 
the Bilski case is one that would leave State Street Bank decided 
exactly the same way.  That was a machine; therefore it is 
patentable, right? 
So what I would say, I think I am probably—I haven’t seen 
how much time I have, five minutes, I have five minutes left. 
The thing I would emphasize to you is that, when you consider 
what types of innovations are and are not properly subject to 
regulation by patents, you really need to look beyond the form to 
the substance.  So it ought not be particularly significant that a 
machine is recited in a claim. 
What ought to be significant is the contribution made by the 
person who applied for the patent—what gives value to what the 
person disclosed in an application or what the person conceived. 
Then you can have a meaningful conversation about whether or 
not the contribution that was made is one that is fairly 
characterized as falling within the useful arts, properly understood 
and properly characterized as falling within any of the statutory 
classifications, and that will avoid a lot of the artifice that has 
unfortunately dominated a great deal of the debate over this 
question. 
The Bilski case, unlike the State Street Bank case, has exposed 
in all of its nakedness the “what kind” question.  In the State Street 
Bank case, since the claims cited a machine, it was ambiguous why 
those claims were allowed.  This has great practical importance in 
litigation, let me tell you. 
If you have, for instance, a patent that recites a computer 
system that is configured to provide certain asserted valuable, 
observable behaviors, well, one of the things that you have to do in 
patent litigation nowadays is to interpret what the claim words 
mean. This is a process known as “claim construction.”65  Patent 
 
 65 Patenthawk.com, Staking a Claim—Legal Backdrop, http://patenthawk.com/ 
claims.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
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claim words are supposed to be interpreted from the point of view 
of a person having skill in the art of a patent.66  Well, a patent 
claiming a computer system is configured to maintain books of 
account, or to implement an online trading system, or to carry on 
business activity of some kind, confounds analysis.  Who is the 
person skilled in the art?  Is it the person who uses the system, the 
bond trader, the commodities trader, the online vendor?  Is it the 
programmer who programs the computer system to bring about 
these behaviors, or is it the computer system? 
I had a case in which a patent recited providing a workup 
system state.  The word “state” means something quite different to 
a person in the field of computer science than it might to someone 
who doesn’t know anything about computer programming.  State is 
a term of art in one field; it is not in another.  Those kinds of 
complexities arise when you do not focus on the applicant’s 
contribution, but instead get too caught up in the form in which 
claimed inventions are patented. 
I am going to subside at this point and turn it over to my co-
panelists.  But I’ll be happy to answer any questions you may have 
after the others are done.  Thank you. 
PROF. LONG:   
[Please note that Professor Long’s remarks are not published in 
this transcript.] 
MR. MURPHY: 
I am just going to rely on a few PowerPoints to try and help my 
presentation along.  So I do not know if anyone can call those up 
for me. 
But good—while we wait for that, good morning everyone.  
Yes, that would not be me.  I am Brian Murphy.  I am going to be 
speaking from a different perspective.  It is a counterpoint, I think, 
in many ways to the issues Jim has raised and it really picks up, I 
think, probably on the last point that Clarisa was just making about 
a very interesting analogy to the color white, and how do you 
know it if you have never seen it before. 
 
 66 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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You must understand that underlying this intellectual debate 
about what is patent eligible and what might not be patent eligible 
is a very commercially significant dispute between two industries.  
There is the financial services industry, which is tired of business 
method patents, tired of being sued, they feel, frivolously, in the 
Eastern District of Texas, where judgments are being entered 
against them.  Then there are the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries.  These industries are very fearful that the Supreme 
Court and even the Federal Circuit have gone too far in using 
machine-or-transformation as a proxy for the initial threshold of 
what is patent eligible, which is to be distinguished from, and it is 
an important distinction, the requirements of patentability. 
In my view, the Bilski test, particularly for processes—pure 
processes—goes too far only because it is a mandatory test.  It is a 
mandatory proxy.  I think it is a useful test.  It is particularly useful 
in the business method context, it is very useful to limit business 
method patents and that’s what was done. 
Perhaps the unintentional consequence is, what do you do in 
other areas, other scientific industries, like diagnostic methods or 
genetic screening methods, where focusing on the notion of 
transformation really does not get you to the heart of the question?  
Because it is not necessarily the transformation that is the inventive 
concept, the inventive concept is recognizing a correlation between 
data and a condition.  What is more important than diagnosis? 
You cannot treat the patient optimally until you have the right 
diagnosis and that is what a lot of these method claims are all 
about. 
So my thesis is that the transformational analysis focuses on 
the wrong question.  I hope the Supreme Court considers going 
back to the so-called Fundamental Principles Exception, where the 
better question is does the invention as a whole preempt a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, a natural law, or fundamental principle.67 
 
 67 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
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No one disagrees that a naturally occurring phenomenon is not 
patentable and that it is a broad test.68  The point is—it is a low 
bar. 
The reason it is a low bar is because courts have always 
understood that what inventors really are entitled to is a rigorous 
examination under the conditions for patentability.  The conditions 
for patentability are in section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act.69  These 
conditions are the second part of the test, while the natural 
phenomenon preemption is the first part of the test.  The first part 
of the test is a very low bar while the second part is a much higher 
bar. 
Just because a process might qualify as patent eligible, 
absolutely does not mean you’re going to get a patent, and that is, I 
think, part of the visceral reaction, particularly that you get by the 
Supreme Court Justices, like you saw in Laboratory Corp. of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (“LabCorp”).70  
LabCorp will be discussed briefly, but the question one has to ask 
is how that could possibly be patentable, it is too broad.71 
Maybe the problem in LabCorp is that the claim is not 
particularly claimed or it is overbroad.  But is it really not patent 
eligible?72  Maybe, maybe.  Then the really important question is 
what test do you apply?  Should the court apply the machine-or-
transformation test, and particularly the transformation test for 
process patents regardless of the technology area?73 
 
 68 See id. (“This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to [35 U.S.C.] § 101 and 
every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.  Excluded from such patent 
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). 
 69 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title [35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376].”). 
 70 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).   
 71 See id. at 125–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the patent claim invalid as a 
natural phenomenon).  
 72 See id.  
 73 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. 
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 
2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
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We are having some technical difficulties, so I’ll try to draw 
some images for you. 
Whenever I’m faced with a difficult intellectual question—and 
this is certainly a difficult question—I always ask myself what 
would Mr. Jefferson say? 
Those of you who have read Bilski are familiar with Judge 
Rader’s dissenting opinion where he quoted Thomas Jefferson’s 
belief that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”74  
That is, I think, an eloquent statement of the underlying policy and 
rationale for a broad first step, or low threshold, for patent 
eligibility. 
But even Mr. Jefferson was a little conflicted and recognized 
the difficulty of drawing lines in the area of patentable subject 
matter.  Years later he also said, “[C]onsidering the exclusive right 
to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of 
society, I know well the difficulty of drawing the line between 
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an 
exclusive patent, and those which are not.”75 
Now I’m a fan of Mr. Jefferson, but I do think we have evolved 
quite a bit since the notion of an exclusive patent as an 
embarrassment.  But I think it points out that even from the 
drafting of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
which promotes the progress of science and useful arts,76 there has 
been some conflict.  Where do you draw the line? 
But the line is drawn as a matter of policy, not judicial decision 
making.  When you upset well-settled doctrine in the judicial role, 
you run the risk of stepping over the line.  We all know courts 
consider policy—it is part of human nature and you have to.  But it 
is the role of the legislature to make those policy judgments—not 
the courts. 
Real quickly through the statute, this is what I was referring to 
as the test on eligibility: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
 
 74 Id. at 1011 (Radar, J., dissenting) (quoting WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 
(Washington ed. 1871)).  
 75 Writings from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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and useful process”77—we are focusing on process here because 
that is really what the fight is about—“or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof.”78  That is 
patent eligibility—very broad and to be liberally encouraged. 
Patents are still subject to the conditions and requirements of 
the title we all are familiar with—novelty, utility, sufficient 
description, enablement, claim particularity, and definiteness.79  
These are not insignificant requirements. 
This is well settled law in multiple Supreme Court decisions, 
including Diamond v. Diehr,80 cited for different propositions, 
depending on whether you read the majority or dissenting 
decisions in Bilski, but the quote is, “We have more than once 
cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not 
expressed.”81  This is really, I think, what is underlying this debate. 
What has been clear, what is well-settled law, in terms of 
patent eligibility and particularly of processes, is that a process is 
not patent eligible if it claims a natural law itself.82  One cannot 
claim a natural phenomenon, as LabCorp articulates—electricity, 
metabolic functions that occur naturally in the human body, and 
the atomic structure are natural phenomena—one cannot claim 
these things effectively.83  And, of course, abstract ideas, 
particularly mathematical algorithms, which apply with particular 
force in the business method context, are not patentable.84 
 
 77 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 78 Id.  
 79 See id. §§ 101, 112. 
 80 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  Note that the proposition of Diehr is different in Bilski’s 
majority and dissent. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Radar, J., 
dissenting) (“In reading Diehr to suggest a non-statutory transformation or preemption 
test, this court ignores the Court’s admonition that all recent holdings do no more than 
restate the natural laws . . . exclusions.”), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 
2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 
2009). 
 81 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (internal quotations omitted).   
 82 “Einstein could not have ‘patent[ed] his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could 
Newton have patented the law of gravity.’” Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id.  
 84 See, e.g., id.  
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Now I will focus on the life sciences patents to add a little 
context.  Generally it has been clear that novel pharmacologic 
agents constitute patentable subject matter.  There are thousands, if 
not tens of thousands, of patents on novel pharmacologic agents—
small molecule drugs or prescription drugs that we consume every 
day.  Isolated DNA and RNA sequences are well established as 
patentable and are useful in biotechnology companies as probes for 
assessing binding affinity or for testing potentially new and helpful 
biological molecules as therapeutics.85  Recombinant proteins and 
therapeutic proteins, such as Genentech’s Rituxan and Herceptin, 
are incredibly powerful drugs that are patentable.86  There is no 
question they are patent eligible as they both are in fact patented. 
Moving down the line, methods of treatment typically claimed 
in the pharmaceutical arena as administration of therapeutically 
effective amounts of a drug are classically patentable.87  There is 
no need to go into what the transformation is. 
A more interesting example is surgical procedures.  In the early 
1990s, a successful eye surgeon claimed and had patented a pure 
method of making a particular type of incision in cataract eye 
surgery.88  It was clearly purely process and needed only a scalpel 
and a physician to use it, but the claim was the process for using 
that particular type of incision.  It was a particular practical 
application of a process, it did not preempt all types of cataract 
surgery, and it did not preempt all types of eye surgery. 
There was never any question that the process was patent 
eligible.  There was an absolute outcry and uproar by the American 
Medical Association, on a policy basis, that you should not be able 
 
 85 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,313,282 (filed July 18, 1997) (issued Nov. 6, 2001) 
(claiming an isolated DNA sequence which can serve as a terminator region in a chimeric 
gene capable of being used for the transformation of plants).  
 86 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,297,760 (filed Dec. 15, 2003) (issued Nov. 20, 2007); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,736,137 (filed Nov. 3, 1993) (issued Apr. 7, 1998). 
 87 See, e.g., Nicardipine Pharm. Composition for Parenteral Admin., U.S. Patent No. 
5,164,405 (filed Oct. 22, 1990) (issued Nov. 17, 1992). 
 88 Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision, U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (filed 
June 28, 1990) (issued Jan. 14, 1992). 
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to enforce such a patent.89  The issue was not patent eligibility, it 
was patent enforceability, and Congress spoke.  It spoke by 
enacting § 287(c), which now precludes the enforcement of these 
particular types of medical procedures during surgery.90 
I submit that is the more appropriate precedent for what I think 
we are dealing with now, in Bilski.  I think you have, in the Federal 
Circuit’s majority decision, a very sophisticated use of a proxy test 
that, in fact, intentionally narrows patent eligibility, when it should 
not, but perhaps unintentionally does not appreciate the impact on 
new technologies, particularly in the pharmaceutical and biotech 
arena. 
Briefly, these types of diagnostic method claims, in LabCorp. 
which we will go to immediately, have been called “determine-
and-infer.”  So determine and infer is a two-step process, a credit 
to Professor Collins, who has kind of characterized it this way.91 
The first step is an assay step.92  It is very physical, very 
specific: you take a blood test, you run the test, whatever you are 
looking for, you get a result. 
From the result, you infer or make a diagnosis that happens in 
the mind of the trained physician.  That is the process. 
If you analyzed it, under well settled law of the Fundamental 
Principles Exception, the question that should be asked is whether 
the claim as a whole recites a natural law, a natural phenomenon, 
extract, idea; or perhaps more usefully, does the claim as a whole 
define an application of the principle or the phenomenon that has 
been discovered, that no one discovered before, but happens to be 
naturally occurring.  Is that being applied with sufficient 
 
 89 See Sabra Chartrand, Why Is This Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at D1 
(“Leaders of the medical community are scrambling to stamp out a trend they think 
threatens innovation—and a doctor’s freedom to offer patients the best care.”). 
 90 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006); see also Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Cataract & 
Refractive Surgery, President Signs Medical Patent Bill; Physicians Freed from Threat of 
New Medical Procedure Patent Lawsuits (Oct. 1, 1996), available at http://www.cptech. 
org/ip/cataract.txt. 
 91 See Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of 
Intangibility, PATENTLY-O, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/collins. 
intangibility.pdf. 
 92 Id. at 1. 
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particularity so that it does not preempt all uses of the principle, 
like the surgical method and the incision technique that was patent 
eligible and patented, but ultimately non-enforceable?93 
Contrast that to a mandatory Bilski analysis.  Does the assay 
step transform a particular article into a different state or a thing?  
Who cares?  Of course it does. 
That is not the heart of the invention.  The heart of the 
invention was the recognition of a relationship, and in LabCorp, it 
was a naturally occurring relationship or phenomenon.94 
The transformation really is not essential.  So by design, you 
perhaps have condemned these types of claims to patent 
ineligibility without ever having given the Patent Office or the 
patentee the opportunity to try and get them examined rigorously 
under the statutory requirements for patentability. 
Under Bilski, if there is a transformation, the question is if it is 
central to the purpose of the claim process and not merely what is 
called “insignificant extra-solution activity.”95  That is a danger for 
those in the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnological arts. 
So let us take a quick look at LabCorp.  This was the so-called 
determine-and-infer template, and it is a very broad claim.  The 
method is for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate, a 
naturally occurring human condition, which is a disease.96 
To detect it, you assay a body fluid, take a blood sample, and 
run the test, which is clearly transformative, but all you are looking 
for is this particular homocysteine level.  This is nothing new.  
People already knew how to measure for homocysteine.  What was 
new is somebody who said, “ah-ha,” if you have elevated 
homocysteine, if you are not within the normal bounds for this 
blood test, you have a cobalamin or folate deficiency, you are a 
very sick person, and you need a particular kind of treatment. 
 
 93 See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127–28 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. 
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
 96 See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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What is not included in the claim is any particular application 
of the phenomenon. This phenomenon, the correlation between 
elevated homocysteine levels and a deficiency of these two 
vitamins, is naturally occurring.  No one created it, you are simply 
observing it, and you can’t patent it. 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, which everyone has had a lot to 
say about, I think, first analyzed it and under the Fundamental 
Principles Exception noted that the correlation itself is a natural 
phenomenon, there was really no dispute.97  That doesn’t 
necessarily end the analysis of patent eligibility because you need 
to look at the claim as a whole.  What else does the claim say?  In 
this case, all it says is you assay to get a homocysteine level. 
He said next, in a pre-Bilski application of the transformation 
test, that the claim didn’t recite a process for transforming blood or 
any other matter.98  In my view, this was clearly wrong.  I think it 
was legally relevant, but wrong.  That was part of the problem with 
applying this test in this area of technology. 
He finally answered the question, if you will, as a formulation 
of the so-called insignificant extra-solution activity concept, and he 
got to the heart of the matter.  The only thing he can find, apart 
from the assay, which was nothing new and not unique, was the 
correlation.  “I can find nothing [in this claim] that adds anything 
more of significance.”99  What he was really talking about was, 
where’s the practical application? 
In re Grams,100 another case, was interesting because it was 
noted by Bilski in the Federal Circuit.  It is interesting because it is 
really a combination of what I call a determined-and-inferred 
diagnostic process, but also uses Bilski-type algorithms to crunch 
data.  What you’re really doing is taking a whole bunch of data 
from a blood test.  You take a blood panel of multiple data 
points—not just, for example, a homocysteine level—you crunch 
and you basically program on a computer and you try and tease out 
and isolate what’s causing the illness.  But again, that’s, in case 
 
 97 Id. at 135. 
 98 See id. at 136. 
 99 Id. at 138. 
 100 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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you can’t see it, that icon is a thinker, meaning it’s a thinking step.  
So the only assay or physical step is taking the blood sample, 
followed by a bunch of algorithms or mental processes, which is 
very clearly found to be non-statutory subject matter, but analyzed, 
and Judge Michel was one of the panel members on this decision, 
the claim as a whole covers an algorithm. 
They actually explored a different test, called the Freeman-
Walter-Abele Test,101 but the concept was there was no practical 
application to a process and that physical elements and mere data-
gathering was just not enough to cut it. 
What I found most interesting was that Bilski commented on 
this case and said, “[I]n most cases, gathering data would not 
constitute a transformation of any article.”102  Well, that’s true.  In 
the business method context, and in the software context, it’s 
manifestly not true, as we’ll see in the Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services103 case that was just decided, 
when you’re talking about diagnostic methods. 
So let’s look at Prometheus—that is perhaps the most 
interesting case—recently decided, post-Bilski. 
In an interesting twist, not purely claimed as a so-called 
diagnostic method, not just determine-and-infer.  What was 
different?  It was looking to optimize treatment.  They 
administered a patient a drug which metabolizes.  So you’re 
looking for this thing called 6-TG, just like homocysteine, and you 
want to find out what the level is in the person’s body. 
Under Bilski, if you’re looking at this from the machine-or-
transformation perspective, the first two steps, in my view, are 
nothing more than mere data-gathering in the two-step process, 
rather than a one-step process. 
That is where Bilski can lead to a false result, because the 
wherein clauses, which is supposed to be the practical application 
 
 101 See, e.g., In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 102 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. 
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
 103 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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of understanding this relationship, that if you have too much of the 
metabolite, or, excuse me, an X-level, you need to increase the 
dosage.  If you have a higher level, the Y-level, you have to 
decrease the dosage of the drug.  Those wherein clauses don’t tell 
you to administer the drug or to increase the dose.  They are, I 
think, accurately characterized by the district court below,104 who 
rejected this claim as a warning to say, okay, I have administered 
the drug. I’ve measured my level of metabolite.  I know it is a 
warning.  It tells you I should increase the dose, or I should 
decrease the dose.   It does not tell you that you need to do it or 
how to do it, but that does not mean it is not patent eligible. 
If you analyzed it under the Fundamental Principles Exception 
and asked, are you preempting a naturally occurring phenomenon 
with this claim?  The answer is clearly no.  It’s a simpler test, and 
you don’t run into the, I think, intellectual gymnastics that the 
Federal Circuit used to try and save this claim.  It used, in my 
view, the improper analogy that it’s a method of treatment.  It’s 
okay because it’s a method—the language was, in effect, it’s a 
method of treatment. 
It’s not a diagnostic trying to optimize a treatment method.  If 
you wanted to claim a method of treatment, you would have said, 
in the end, administer the following dosage of the drug.  It doesn’t 
say that. 
Under a Fundamental Principles Exception test, you would 
simply say the drug had to be administered by a man, to generate a 
metabolite level.  That is a man-made, if you will, correlation, it’s 
not naturally occurring.  It is not someone who is sick and whose 
sickness is represented by some naturally occurring metabolic 
function.  It is a man-made intervention to create a metabolite level 
and say, hey, look that is not a naturally occurring phenomenon; 
this claim is patent eligible. 
Again, it doesn’t mean the claim is, per se, patentable.  But if 
you use the Fundamental Principles Exception test, however you 
wish, I think you focus on the better question, which is: are you 
 
 104 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 05cv1200, 2008 WL 
878910, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (characterizing the “wherein” clause as “only a 
mental step” and not requiring any action).  
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preempting all uses, an entire field of uses of a particular naturally 
occurring phenomenon or are you not?  Are you doing something 
more?  In your claim, is there either a non-naturally occurring 
phenomenon, as in this case, or is there a practical application or 
treatment step, whether it’s administration of a drug, using a 
particular surgical technique, or using non-invasive therapy?  
Whatever it might be, you either need to add that practical step or 
you need to have something that’s not a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, as in Prometheus.105 
So my real point here is that I think Prometheus gives you an 
excellent example of where the transformation test has limitations 
that were unintended.  It’s not particularly helpful to address the 
questions of what’s really patent eligible, what’s the inventive 
concept, and has the claim been drafted that way? 
We do need the flexibility of that Fundamental Principles 
Exception and I think the best question to be asked is the bottom 
one.  Does the process preempt the principle of phenomenon or 
apply it in a particularized way?  If you ask that question, you will 
get a better result in terms of patent eligibility. 
Thank you. 
PROF. FROMER: 
Okay.  Now we’re going to have some time for Q&A. 
I’d just ask that you please state your name before you ask your 
question. 
MR. MILLER: 
Hi.  I’m Joel Miller.  I have a question for Mr. Dabney. 
If I mischaracterize, please correct me, I understood, rather 
than look at the specific category of 101, you would advocate the 
contribution that the claimed invention would bring.  How would a 
court, and perhaps more importantly, how would the PTO address 
whether a claim has this contribution?  And clean it up for me, if I 
didn’t state it accurately please.  Thank you. 
MR. DABNEY: 
 
 105 Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1336. 
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Well, what I basically advocate is trying to avoid allowing a 
formalism, such as machine-or-transformation, to dominate the 
analysis. 
Every time the Patent Office has to decide whether claimed 
subject matter is non-obvious, they need to identify the differences 
between what is claimed and what was previously known.  Very 
often, those differences will lie solely in something like a method 
of doing business, a set of legal relationships, etc. 
The hard question, therefore, simply becomes analyzing 
whether the differences between something claimed and what pre-
existed count for purposes of patentability. 
So if the only difference between a particular machine and last 
year’s machine is the tax shelter scheme that it implements, you 
can isolate on that and say, is this the kind of innovation that 
qualifies for patent protection, shorn of the confounding that comes 
from analyzing it as a machine or asking whether the fact that it’s 
characterized as a machine, should that matter at all? 
So that’s what I was trying to do, to focus on the differences 
as—in a § 103 context. 
MR. MILLER: 
So if I understand correctly, you’re not focusing so much on 
eligibility, rather novelty and obviousness? 
MR. DABNEY: 
No.  The debate in Bilski, the debate in Prometheus, the debate 
in all of these cases has to do, ultimately, at the end of the day, 
with whether or not a patent should be granted, on subject matter 
that’s claimed.106 
We’ve heard, I think, a fairly compelling demonstration that 
the discovery that a certain physical correlation between 
homocysteine levels, for example, and a certain disease condition 
is not very well-analyzed, in terms of whether it’s tied to a 
particular machine or whether it transforms matter from one state 
of thing to another. 
 
 106 Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1336; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943. 
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But I think most people when they’re in the room would 
instinctively see that there’s a qualitative, or an important, 
difference between that type of discovery and the creation of a 
dispute resolution process in which you put an arbitration clause in 
the will, which was the In re Comiskey107 case, which was the only 
case, by the way, where the Federal Circuit had tentatively 
provided an answer to the hard question, which is, okay, suppose 
it’s not Bilski where it’s just the legal relationships and you do 
have a machine and the only difference is the allegedly novel set of 
legal relationships that the machine implements.  The Federal 
Circuit’s original answer in Comiskey was so controversial that 
they went back, basically, to expunge from the Federal Reporter 
that portion of the opinion in which the court had basically said 
that the alleged novel legal relationships do not count in a § 103 
analysis.108  So that’s been left for another day, as to whether to do 
that. 
The one thing that no one has said, but what I think is kind of a 
sleeper issue here, is that the Constitution uses the word 
“Discoveries.”109 
Now, what obviously happened in the LabCorp case, what 
obviously happened in the Prometheus case, what obviously has 
happened in all these determine-and-infer cases, a person has 
discovered something.  People are afraid of trying to patent things 
that are characterized as discoveries because of other formalisms 
that say, “well, you can’t patent a discovery, it’s got to be an 
invention,” something like that. 
It seems to me that there’s a big difference between those 
different types of conceptions.  It’s a long-winded way to respond, 
but it’s the same question at the end of the day: you have to 
identify how the claimed invention differs from the prior art. 
But the hard question is not going to be whether or not it’s 
wrapped in the machine or whether you characterize it as a 
 
 107 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 108 “Acting en banc, the court today vacated the September 20, 2007, judgment in this 
case, and the panel’s original opinion, which is reported at 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), was withdrawn.” Id. at 969. 
 109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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transformation or not.  I believe it’s, at the end of the day, going to 
come down to whether or not it is the type of conception that falls 
within the useful arts. 
MR. GRAFF: 
Focusing on what you just said, and also applying it in the 
diagnostics area, let’s be practical.  A doctor observes something in 
a patient and he may or may not have read the patent or he may 
have thought of it himself, and he recognizes a relationship 
between this condition and a particular disease or symptom or 
whatever, needs vitamin B-12 or whatever Metabolite. 
Does it make sense in the real world to say that having thought 
of this, the doctor is infringing a patent, he owes a royalty or he 
can be enjoined from treating a patient for the disease because he 
recognized a correlation that existed and a particular physical 
condition?  Does that make any sense from a commercial point of 
view, from an economic point of view, is that someplace that the 
patent law ought to be going, to use Mr. Dabney’s phrase, is that 
the sort of thing that ought to be patented? 
MR. DABNEY: 
Well, I guess, the answer to a question like that very much 
depends on how the story is told.  If the story is told that 
researchers, at some major research university spent years and 
years and years doing basic research to try to understand how the 
body responds to various external stimuli and after expenditure of 
years of effort and investment, a Nobel Prize-winning discovery is 
made, that the way to avoid contracting certain diseases is to 
respond when a certain correlation is found to exist by drinking a 
glass of milk or something like that.  It may or may not wind up 
being novel; it may or may not be something that’s patentable for 
other reasons.  But it’s hard to see why you would say 
categorically that that’s not a discovery within the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
It may be that you can prove that it was inherently anticipated 
and it’s not novel or something like that, but what we’re talking 
about is, I believe, what all is comprehended within the meaning of 
the phrase “useful arts” in the Constitution.  That’s what has 
people so worried about Bilski—that the Supreme Court can’t duck 
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that question and at least some originalists on the Supreme Court 
are quite interested in that question. 
So it seems to me that there’s a lot of room for argument, 
whether or not the recognition of a correlation between 
phenomenon A and condition B is a discovery that can’t 
appropriately be patented. 
If it’s a truly natural phenomenon, you won’t be able to patent 
it under any of these doctrines here.  But if, for instance, you 
artificially disturb that natural phenomenon by doing a certain 
thing—. 
MR. GRAFF: 
Well, then Prometheus holds, really. 
MR. DABNEY: 
Yes, and it’s really not at all surprising to me. 
MR. MURPHY: 
I agree. I just wanted to jump in and say it’s all in how you 
claim it.  Jim’s last point is exactly the seminal point.  If you do 
something to artificially disturb, alter, apply the concept that’s 
been discovered, it’s patent eligible and can be tested—but if you 
claim it, as they tried in LabCorp that was just one claim, by the 
way, for context. 
The LabCorp claim was the broadest claim, there are lots of 
other claims that there was no dispute about patent eligibility or 
even patentability because there were particular methods of 
carrying out the assay that the defendant Metabolite actually used 
for a time, paid a royalty, then stopped using and said, I’m not 
paying the royalty, it’s a big commercial fight, that’s all that was. 
But that particular claim, in its breadth, I think no one—I don’t 
think there’s any serious dispute, it’s not patent eligible, because of 
the way it was claimed, as a whole, trying to preempt an entire 
natural phenomenon, which happened to be a very powerful new 
discovery.  But you can’t claim it that way, and I don’t think the 
law should be that broad or should trend in that direction. 
MR. GRAFF: 
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To follow-up, I don’t see a huge difference between your 
characterization of how Prometheus should have been decided, 
which I understood to be a condition that was induced by man and 
a transformation test.  Because as I understand the transformation 
test, if properly applied, is simply changing something from the 
way it existed in nature, which is the way I think the Federal 
Circuit applied it in its decision. 
MR. MURPHY: 
Yes, I think that the problem I had with it, I think it lends itself, 
transformation, as applied, particularly in cases like LabCorp, 
Grams, and Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC110 and 
the so-called transformation, they’re focusing on extracting a blood 
sample or testing it as a transformation. 
The administration of the drug allows you to generate a piece 
of data.  Sure, it’s a transformation, but that’s not really the 
patentable discovery.  What they’re focusing on is you’re taking 
that data point and then you’re making a new correlation. 
I just think the transformation test unduly narrows the focus of 
the inquiry, that’s all, that’s all I’m saying.  I think, because if you 
read the decision, the court said it’s effectively a method of 
treatment.  That’s the problem, that’s really the problem I have 
with it, because it’s not. 
MR. DABNEY: 
There’s nothing wrong with transformation as an idea to use in 
an analysis like this.  The problem with it is the same problem that 
any formalism has, you can’t generalize from it very well.  You 
can’t abstract it, it doesn’t apply and it lends itself to arguments 
that, well, my legal relationships have been transformed, my 
economic condition has been transformed, my risks have been 
hedged, and have been transformed—there were some silly 
arguments that were made in the Bilski case. 
So certainly as to many traditional technologies, the fact that 
crude oil is transformed into various distillates is something that 
it’s easy to see, that that is a process.  But it just isn’t—it doesn’t—
to say that that is part of a unitary standard of broad general 
 
 110 Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 2008 WL 5273107 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008).  
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applicability without pausing to consider, well, does this fall within 
the useful arts or not?  I’m just going to say, a machine-or-
transformation?  It seems to me it’s an oversimplification. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Hi.  Steve Hoffberg.  I have a comment and a question. 
The comment, I present for three reasons.  One is, we’re in an 
academic environment, I want to justify the use—my fiddling with 
a Smartphone during your presentation, and it also gets to the issue 
of person of skill in the art and the interpretation of words.  There’s 
a definition of the word “Embarrassment” that is “A state of 
confusion arising from hesitation or difficulty in choosing.”111 
So the common definition we accept today is not the only one 
and probably is not the one that Jefferson intended. 
The question I have is, if a new use of an old machine is 
presumably acceptable as patentable subject matter, why is not a 
new function of an old machine? 
MR. DABNEY: 
Who says it isn’t? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Well, that’s a question that the Supreme Court is wrestling 
with. 
MR. DABNEY: 
Well, no, it isn’t, because in the Bilski case, there is no 
apparatus involved at all. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Oh, no, I’m talking about what was said from the bench, in 
terms of whether an old computer with new software is really just 
an old computer and not a patentable machine, or whether the 
software is treated as making it into a new machine. 
MR. DABNEY: 
I personally will be very surprised if the Supreme Court 
Justices say one word about software or articulates a holding that is 
 
 111 Allwords.com, Embarrassment, http://www.allwords.com/word-embarrassment.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
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at least intended by them to have any impact, whatsoever, on the 
software industry. 
I know why they’re worried about it, they have reason to be 
worried about it, but the case certainly does not involve that.  
There’s absolutely no conceptual problem with saying that a 
computer system that is configured with software is a novel 
machine, there just isn’t.  The difficult questions that come with 
claims to computer-implemented subject matter are where there is 
no novelty, or nonobviousness, in the means of implementation, 
but the value lies in the end-results, the effects produced, the 
behaviors that the computer brings about.  Those types of 
questions, very often, shade into Bilski-type problems because the 
end-results might be implementing a set of legal relationships.  
You get right back to the question of what the difference is. 
If the difference is a difference that has value because of 
something that is a business method, then you get into the question 
that I was trying to deal with, with the question over here.  But I 
don’t think that computer software, that the question you’re raising 
is one that there’s any serious debate about today, despite what 
some commentators have sort of tried to shout down from the 
mountaintop, that Bilski is going to spell the death of software.  I 
personally don’t see that there’s any significant chance of that. 
PROF. FROMER: 
I think we have time for one more question. 
MS. PFAFFENBACH: 
I just had a question, in all these cases, whether it’s Bilski or 
Prometheus or LabCorp what is discovered is an algorithm, a 
relationship; we have X, you end up at the other side with Y. 
The inventive part of it, which doesn’t seem to be claimed, in 
the case—well, maybe in LabCorp, I’ll take Prometheus, is that if 
human, something new made by man, would be to inject another 
variable, to then make Y enhanced, or decreased.  Wouldn’t that 
be—that would be patentable.  Would that—is that arguable? 
MR. MURPHY: 
Well, I mean, I think if I understand you correctly, I think the 
answer is, yes, it would be patent eligible.  It’s the human 
C01_PANEL_1_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2010  11:53 AM 
752 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:715 
 
intervention in some way that needs to be particularized in the 
claim. 
MS. PFAFFENBACH: 
Right. 
MR. MURPHY: 
That allows you to do that, but in the absence of such a 
particularized step, and it only takes one step, it would not be 
patent eligible if it’s merely the discovery of something that’s 
naturally occurring. 
MR. DABNEY: 
This question about embarrassment made me think of 
something that could possibly be something that the Supreme 
Court does in Bilski. 
Those of you who have ever taken copyright law know that in 
some important Supreme Court decisions, after-developed 
technologies have come before the court.  Well, the—does the 
Constitutional term “Writings” apply to photographs, which were 
not known at the time of the Constitution?112  Does the 
Constitutional term “Writings” apply to player piano rolls113 or 
phonograph records and other things that didn’t exist at the 
time?114 
So if the Supreme Court is going to get serious about 
construing the Constitution in this case, it would possibly have 
occasion to consider whether or not this Bilski case is in the 
tradition of those.   The problem that Bilski is going to have is that 
in 1787, there was a lot of business going on. 
What’s claimed in Bilski is not exactly like an after-developed 
technology like phonograph records or photography or something 
like that.  So certainly the questions on the bench from all the 
Justices, I think, would lead one to think that if that was the 
direction they were going to go, they would say that this type of 
commercial activity, hedging, was certainly known at the time of 
 
 112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 113 See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 114 See, e.g., id.  
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the framing and we cannot, therefore, say that they were going to, 
no matter what philosophy you adopt—whether it’s the originalists 
or a more, whatever the other alternative philosophy is, I don’t 
want to characterize it—they would lose under that as well. 
PROF. FROMER: 
Okay.  Please join me in thanking our panelists. 
